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THE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET, AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
AKHIL REED AMAR*
The essay is a slight revision of a presentation delivered by Akhil Reed
Amar at the Presidential Powers: Prudence or Perversion? symposium on
October 7, 2010, sponsored by the University of Saint Thomas Journal of
Law and Public Policy.
Of all the textual uncertainties confronting America's first president,
none loom larger than the indeterminacy shrouding his own role in the new
constitutional order. The text made some things clear: America's chief
executive would serve a four-year renewable term; would wield a federal
veto pen and a federal pardon pen; would personally oversee high executive
officers whom he would hand-pick, with senatorial support; would make
treaties, again with senatorial involvement; could win reelection
independently of Congress; and could be ousted from office only if a House
majority and a Senate super majority found him guilty of gross misconduct.
In all these respects, America's president would tower far above a
typical state governor, yet remain far below England's King George III. But
exactly how far above and how far below should Washington position
himself on various executive power issues as to which the constitutional
text was silent or opaque? For starters, could he lay claim to any general
executive powers or executive privileges beyond the presidential
responsibilities that were specifically listed in the constitutional text? Now,
the executive article, Article II, opened with the following words: "The
executive powers shall be vested in the President of the United States of
America."' This sentence appeared to confer on the president a general
residuum of executive power above and beyond very specific presidential
powers and duties itemized a few paragraphs later. Yet ordinary Americans,
during the ratification period, could be forgiven for missing this point.
Article I confined Congress to an enumerated list of specified powers and
Article III, likewise, limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to a textually
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enumerated list. While Article II used subtly different language that
suggested that the list of specific presidential powers was exemplary, rather
than exhaustive, it took an eagle eye to spot the textual difference, and few
Americans during the ratification period paid attention to the powerful
possibilities coiled within Article II's opening clause. Eager to persuade
anxious anti-federalists that the Constitution did not swing toward
monarchy, leading federalists directed the public's gaze to the limited
nature of the specially enumerated presidential responsibilities.
Faithful constitutionalists, seeking to honor the text as originally
understood, are thus yanked hard in opposite directions. On the one hand,
most ratifiers may not have realized that the president would enjoy a
residual executive power. On the other hand, the people had said yes to a
text that seemed to say just that, and surely the public did understand that
the Constitution would summon up a far more muscular executive than
anything they had experienced in 1776.
A seeming tension between the text and the public understanding in
1787 should prompt us to take a closer look at both, in the hope that we
might find some means of reconciliation. Why didn't the text delimit the
scope of presidential power with more clarity and exactitude and why didn't
the ratifying conventionists obsess more over every facet of Article II? At
least three factors converged to blunt the textual edges of the executive
article and to blur the precision of the accompanying ratification
conversation.
First, no ancient or modem legal model closely prefigured the contours
of the federal chief executive that the founders were attempting to conjure
up. British monarchs had ruled by dint of noble birth and claims of divine
rights. Most colonial governors had answered to kings, most post-
independent state governors seemed far too weak. The presiding officer of
the federation congress was, likewise, a mere shadow of the new president
Americans were trying to invent. Though Americans could agree that their
new president needed to have a very different package of powers than any
previous executive, there remained understandable uncertainty about
exactly what package would be best.
Second, the very nature of presidential power made it hard in 1787 and
continues to make it hard today to fully specify the precise boundaries of
that power in all contingencies. In a nutshell, Congress passes laws,
authorizes expenditures, polices its own membership and oversees the other
branches' investigations and impeachment, while federal courts decide
cases under law and monitor subordinates within the judicial branch. By
contrast, presidents perform a wider range of qualitatively different tasks;
they promulgate interstitial rules, much like legislators, they find facts,
construe laws and apply laws to facts in the first instance, much like judges,
but they also do much, much more.
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For example, they officially propound new legislation and define a
reform agenda; they participate in the passage of federal statutes; they pick
federal judges; they direct and communicate and coordinate action with
state governments; they stand atop a vast bureaucratic pyramid, filling and
sometimes thinning the ranks of federal executive officialdom; they collect
revenues and disburse funds; they manage federal properties; they file and
defend lawsuits on behalf of the nation; they prevent, investigate and
prosecute civil and criminal misconduct; they ponder mercy for miscreants;
they command armed forces in both war and peace; they respond to large-
scale disasters and crises; and they direct diplomacy and international
espionage and they personify America internationally. Even today,
sophisticated commentators often define executive power not affirmatively,
but residually. On this view executive power encompasses all proper
governmental authority that's neither legislative nor judicial in nature.
Legislatures and judiciaries almost always act with standard operating
procedures, but presidents recurrently need to improvise to handle fast-
breaking situations that threaten to up-end the entire system, such as the
Civil War, or which present unique opportunities to promote the national
welfare, like the Louisiana Purchase. The very nature of the presidential
office defies easy textual specification, even after two centuries of post-
founding experience. My first argument was, they didn't have a clear model
for the presidency, and the second is, it's actually hard to specify everything
that presidents properly do.
Third, even had precise textualization of every aspect of presidential
power been theoretically possible, hyper-textualization would nevertheless
have been awkward because Americans in 1787 were not designing the
office in the abstract. This is a point I think that both John Yoo and I very
much agree on. There are some disagreements, but this is a point of strong
commonality.
The framers were tailoring the office for its first intended occupant,
George Washington. Without Washington at the helm as America's first
president, it was widely believed that even a perfectly designed
constitutional-ship state might flounder at the launch. Conversely, with
Washington in charge at the outset, even an imperfect text might work, so
long as the text fit the first man suitably well. An overtextualized executive
article might not match Washington's precise proportions, thus Americans
undertextualized presidency because they trusted Washington to make
sensible adjustments after wearing his custom-made constitutional uniform
and testing it against the elements.
The textual openness of Article II, the give in the garment of the
executive power, was not a design flaw but a desired feature. Now, it's true
that nothing in the official constitutional text required that George
Washington be America's first president, but without its near universal
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understanding that Washington would guide the new ship of state at the
start, the executive article, Article II, would have been drafted in
dramatically different fashion and perhaps nothing closely resembling the
Philadelphia plan would have ever won the express approval of the
American people. And one little fun fact is the attestation clause of the
Constitution, where they all signed their names, begins with the suggestive
signature of the Philadelphia convention's presiding officer, and it reads as
follows: Go. Washington, President.
It is true that nothing in the official constitutionalist text explicitly
delegated authority to George Washington to fill in the blanks and thereby
sharpen the role of all future presidents; but on the other hand, the terse text
doesn't explicitly prohibit this interpretive inference that the framers and
ratifiers were in effect deputizing Washington to clarify the executive
article, subject to the broad advice and consent of the other branches and the
American people. Though the constitutional text does not compel this
delegation to Washington interpretation, the text permits and even invites
this reading for the simple reason that this reading makes sense. It explains
the otherwise puzzling and even dangerous looseness of Article II and turns
what otherwise might seem a failure of draftsmanship and deliberation into
something rather safe and clever. So from this perspective we're now
poised to see how the written and the unwritten Constitution fit together; in
this case the unwritten Constitution is defined by post-ratification
precedence set by Washington himself.
Several of the basic features of America's enduring presidential system
were established less by constitutional text, than by the gloss on the text
provided by Washington's actions, actions that he initially undertook with
scrupulous constitutional conscientiousness and that ultimately won
acceptance from the other branches and the American people. I'll just run
through a few of them. And, here again, on many of these I think I'm
actually rather in sync with John Yoo's very thoughtful paper. There are
going to be some differences, as you'll hear.
First, America's presidents today enjoy unilateral power to officially
recognize and de-recognize foreign governments. In 1979, for example,
without any specific pre-authorization from Congress as a whole or from
the Senate, President Jimmy Carter established normal diplomatic relations
with the Communist People's Republic of China, formally recognizing that
regime as the official sovereign power in China. In the process, Carter cut
formal diplomatic ties with the anti-Communist Taiwanese government,
which had previously been recognized by the U.S. government as the lawful
Chinese regime, and indeed an official America treaty partner. The text of
Article II lists specific presidential responsibilities and this text can be
plausibly stretched to cover the recognition/de-recognition power of the
president. In particular, the list declares that the president, "shall receive
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ambassadors and other public ministers,"2 so you can stretch the text to
reach that.
The text can also be read far more modestly as simply providing that
foreign diplomats from regimes already recognized by the President and
Congress, or alternately lead by the President and the Senate, should as a
matter of official etiquette and protocol and ceremony just present their
credentials to the President when they arrive on American soil. If you read
what Hamilton says in the Federalist Number 67, he actually describes this
recognition clause as a mere matter of etiquette and convenience, more
about dignity than authority, a role of miniscule consequence whose main
effect would be to avoid the need to summon the legislature and the Senate
into special session whenever one diplomat replaces another from a
previously-recognized foreign regime. So if you just look at how the text is
being presented by the federalists, it could read very narrowly; on the other
hand, you could read the text more broadly, there are textual possibilities,
there's structural possibilities, but for me but the strongest legal argument
isn't anything just about the text as understood in the ratification process, or
even structural inferences, because you could argue those either way.
The strongest argument is a powerful precedent set by a powerful
president named Washington. And here's the precedent: When the French
revolutionaries grabbed power and guillotined King Louis, XVI, on
Washington's watch, a momentous American decision had to be made:
Americans could opt to stand by the French monarchy, which had
bankrolled the American revolution and signed treaties of alliance with the
United States in 1778-that's option one. Alternatively, America could
choose to recognize the French revolutionaries as the rightful government
of France, entitled to all the treaty rights of prior regimes-that's option
two.
Or perhaps-this is option three-America could stand aloof from all
French factions in the bloody maelstrom and declare that old treaties were
now entirely void because the original partner, Louis, no longer held power
and because the revolutionary upstarts had no automatic entitlement to the
treaty concessions that Americans have granted only to Louis and Louis's
designated successors, starting with his son, the dauphin. The competing
considerations, loyalty to a family monarchy, solidarity with fellow
democratic revolutionaries, and anxiety about being sucked into an
increasingly violent vortex tugged in different directions.
A wrong decision on America's part could have had dreadful
consequences. Were the U.S. to back the losing contestants in an unfolding
and unpredictable tumult, the ultimate winners might well seek vengeance
against the propitious Americans.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Here's the key point: After consulting his cabinet, George Washington
made the fateful decision himself, in effect transferring America's official
recognition from the fallen French monarchy to the reigning French
revolutionaries. Far more than any word or phrase in the written text ratified
in 1787-88 this post-1789 precedent established the basic ground rules for
all subsequent presidents. For example, Jimmy Carter, in 1979, trying to
decide whether and how America should cut diplomatic links with
displaced sovereigns and create diplomatic ties to new regimes.
That's the real precedent that establishes Jimmy Carter and other
presidents' entitlements to recognize and de-recognize foreign regimes, less
the text than that precedent, an unwritten constitution. The second basic
feature of presidential power, cemented by Washington, considers the
president's unilateral power to communicate, even secretly, with foreign
regimes and negotiate treaties without the Senate's foreknowledge.
President Carter's formal recognition of the People's Republic of China
followed on President Nixon's famous visit to mainland China in 1972,
which in turn built on diplomatic foundations laid in 1971 when Nixon
secretly sent his envoy, Henry Kissinger, to Beijing to parlay with the
Chinese communists. Here, too, we could devote various plausible textual
and structural arguments to support presidential power and, here too, their
plausible textual counter-arguments.
The matter's been settled beyond all doubt, less by the naked
constitutional text than by actual practice of presidents of all parties with
repeated backing of senates and congresses when presidents have sought
formal legal support for previously secret diplomatic initiatives.
Perhaps the most famous and consequential episode occurred when
President Jefferson quickly negotiated for the purchase of the Louisiana
Territory as soon as this vast tract of land was unexpectedly plopped onto
the bargaining table in Paris in the late spring of 1803. Had Jefferson sought
to delay negotiations in order to get detailed advice and pre-approval from
the Senate or House, neither of which was then in session, he might have
run the risk that the mercurial Napoleon might change his mind and whisk
the land off the table. Instead Jefferson, via his hand-picked diplomat,
James Monroe, seized the day and closed the deal. When Congress
convened in the fall, Jefferson won the support of both two-thirds of the
Senate, which ratified the treaty he had negotiated on his own initiative, and
the majority of the House, which later voted, along with the Senate, to
provide the legal structure for the new lands and to foot the bill.
This doubling of the new nation's land mass, one of the most
spectacular diplomatic triumphs in modem world history, followed an
established script. But the script was established less by the debatable text
of the written Constitution, than by the definitive gloss on that text that
Washington had added in the early 1790s.
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The diplomatic initiatives culminating in the famous Jay Treaty,
seeking to expand trade with England and induce the relinquishment of key
frontier fortifications that the British had yet to hand over, as previously
promised, Washington first secretly sent an unofficial emissary, Governor
Morris, a proto of Henry Kissinger, to Britain and then followed up with
formal diplomatic overtures. Although the Senate confirmed Washington's
choice of envoy extraordinaire, John Jay, senators did not preapprove the
specifics of Jay's official diplomatic mission. Instead, Jay followed
Washington's negotiating instructions in the months after-Jay and his
English counterpart-to reach a definitive deal in November 1794, which
was the treaty brought back before American lawmakers.
Eventually, both the Senate and the Congress as a whole endorsed
Washington's diplomatic entrepreneurialism. The Senate ratified the treaty
in June and Congress enacted the necessary implementing legislation and
appropriations.
A third and related piece of executive power also settled squarely into
place as a result of Washington's conduct in the Jay Treaty. After winning
Senate approval for the treaty, Washington reserved the final legal move for
himself. In the end he alone decided whether to officially ratify the treaty in
the name of the nation. Only after he decided to proceed in the wake of the
Senate's "yes" vote, did the treaty become legally binding. He also needed
to secure some British agreement to some modifications that the Senate had
insisted upon as a condition of giving its advice and consent.
While the Constitution's text could be parsed different ways on this
very nice question of treaty-making raised by the power sharing between
presidents and Senate, what's constitutionally decisive today is not the pure
text, but rather the institution of laws first applied by Washington and
accepted then and ever since by his countrymen.
A fourth aspect of executive power involved the neutrality
proclamation, which confirms the president's role as the sole organ of
communication, the person who articulates publicly American foreign
policy to the nation and to the world.
Now, one aspect of the neutrality proclamation is worth noting now
because this aspect has failed the test of time. Washington, in his neutrality
proclamation, suggested that any American who violated the neutrality idea
would be subject to federal prosecution, just because of the Washington
say-so. But the Supreme Court later made clear in an 1812 case, United
States versus Hudson and Goodwin, a classic fed courts case, that American
presidents lack authority to create federal criminal law unilaterally, as do
federal judges.3
There's no federal common law of crimes. This ruling accurately
3. U.S. v. Hudson, II U.S. 32 (1812).
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reflected the Constitution's grand architecture, which guarantees that
ordinarily no person can be convicted of a federal crime unless Congress
first defines the crime and determines the accompanying punishment with
specificity and prospectivity. Textually the legislative article, Article I,
explicitly authorizes Congress-not the President, not the judiciary-to
"define and punish offenses against the law of nations."4 In fact, Congress
did just that in its Neutrality Act of 1794, which provided the proper legal
authorization for the prosecution policy that Washington had prematurely
proclaimed.
Thus, the justices got it just right, when they insisted in 1812, that "the
legislative authority and union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the
offense."5 In this landmark martial court ruling we see the proper limits of
America's unwritten Constitution. Where the text and structure of the
written document are clear, the written Constitution trumps the unwritten
Constitution even where George Washington is concerned.
Those are the Washington precedents. Now, my next little section is
about the heads of the departments, what we call the cabinet. In all the
Washington administration episodes just canvassed, the President relied
heavily on the advice of an inner circle of top executive branch officials and
this advice is to take a hard look at the President's cabinet, which is a word
that nowhere appears in the text of the written Constitution as ratified, but is
an entity that's played an important role in America's actual institutional
system from 1789 to the present.
So here are the key things you need to know about the cabinet: Cabinet
members are the President's men and have been ever since the days of
Washington. America's first president leaned on his cabinet because he had
hand-picked this team, according to the Constitution's explicit appointment
rules, and because these powerful lieutenants answered directly to him
under the Article II opinions clause, which encouraged presidents to require
reports from the principal officers, elsewhere described as the head of each
executive department.
Also key was the fact that these men served at Washington's pleasure.
He had the unilateral power to dismiss them at any time, for any reason, and
he was willing to wield this power. In 1795, within days of receiving
intelligence, raising grave doubts about the fitness of his second Secretary
of State, Edmund Randolph, whom he had appointed to replace Jefferson,
Washington muscled Randolph out of office.
Where does the Constitution give presidents this unilateral, plenary, and
instantaneous authority to fire heads of executive departments? Article II
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
5. Hudson, II U.S. at 34.
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explicitly makes the Senate [inaudible] ordering the hiring of department
heads, arguably the Constitution's text implicitly gives the Senate a
symmetric role in the firing of department heads. A reading would
generally require presidents to win senatorial consent before firing any
cabinet member and, indeed, that's the interpretation that Hamilton puts
forth in Federalist No. 77.
As soon as Washington took the helm, his supporters, in and out of the
first Congress, including Hamilton, who changes his mind on second
thought, insists that the Constitution gave the President a unilateral right to
fire any executive head in whom the chief executive had lost confidence.
After extensive deliberation, the first Congress adopted a series of statutes
designed to acknowledge this presidential claim of right. More than
anything in the terse text or popular understandings that emerged during the
ratification process, it was the first Congress's famous decision of 1789 that
established the bedrock rules of executive branch firing that govern actual
21 st century practice.
Now, I understand the hard-core textualists can insist, as did some of
Washington's supporters, that the President's plenary authority to dismiss
executive branch underlings is simply one aspect of the present executive
power vested by Article II's opening sentence. Here's the problem with that
understanding: If this sentence alone gave the president the power to fire
cabinet officers at-will, logic would suggest that the opening sentence,
likewise, gives the president power to fire at-will all other high-level
executive branch appointees; that is all top appointed federal officers,
except judges and judicial branch officers. This broader power, however,
has not been recognized as an actual American practice over the centuries,
and a wide range of high-profile and well-settled area statutes have long
limited and continue to limit the president's ability to unilaterally remove
nonjudicial officers.
For example, when Barack Obama succeeded George W. Bush in 2009,
everyone understood that Bush's treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, would
need to leave immediately if the new president wanted to give the job to
someone else; and, in fact, Obama let Paulson go. Yet, virtually no one, or
at least no one maybe outside the academy, virtually no one thought that
Obama could likewise immediately dismiss all of the governors of the
Federal Reserve Board, simply because he may have preferred new persons
of his own choosing. On the contrary, the statute authorizing the Federal
Reserve Board, a statute with basic framework that's been in place for
three-quarters of a century, pointedly limits the ability of a new president to
sweep the fed clean on day one; thus, the fed and the treasury are governed
by different firing rules. The simple text of Article II executive power
clause cannot easily explain this interesting difference in actual institutional
practice.
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The best explanation is that in 1789 Congress squarely acknowledged
presidential authority to remove certain kinds of executive appointees at-
will, but made no similar ruling regarding other appointees. The decision in
1789 has in effect glossed the language of Article II of the poll and
established that individual department heads must be subject to unilateral
removal, whenever the president loses confidence in them, for any personal
or political reason. Federal Reserve Board governors differ from Treasury
Secretary Paulson because the system established on Washington's watch
cemented Washington's plenary removal power over treasury secretary
Alexander Hamilton, who was Paulson's founding-era counterpart, and
over all other individual department heads, but in 1789 Congress did not
cement in place identical removal rules for all other executive appointees.
As a result, later congresses were free to enact somewhat different
mechanisms of accountability for these other appointees, even important
executive branch appointees such as governors of the Fed. There are at least
two ways to conceptualize the status of the Fed in light of the decision of
1789. One view is that, governors of the Federal Reserve Board are simply
not department heads, strictly speaking. Unlike the statutory structure
establishing regular cabinet departments, topped by a one-man decisional
head or principal officer, the statute created the Fed to have legal authority
in a multi-member body, thus the Fed and certain other nonjudicial agencies
whose top officials are not removable by the president, may indeed be seen
as headless in a certain sense.
The point is not that these headless agencies live in some mysterious
fourth branch of government, beyond all presidential supervision and
control, after all, even vis-d-vis these agencies. The president remains the
ultimate head of the executive branch and retains broad powers of
appointment and certain additional executive powers of oversight and for-
cause removable, as distinct from at-will removal. These agencies may be
viewed as headless in a much narrower and more technical sense that power
of these agencies resides not in a one-man head principal officer, but
instead in a multi-member commission.
Okay, so that's one way of understanding the status of the Fed; here's a
different way, an alternative interpretation of Article II as lost by the
decision of 1789 is also available, and this is the one I think is most
consistent with the most recent case law, the PCABO case, the PCABO
case just decided a few months ago.6
Here's the alternative interpretation that's available. I'll try to explain
the basic constitutional difference between the Fed and the treasury in a
different way. Perhaps we should think of the Fed not as a headless
6. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (June 28,
2010).
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department, but as a hydra-headed department. On this view hydras can
qualify as department heads and they can be vested with various powers,
but the rules of removal are different for hydras than for individual
department heads. Why, because post-1789 presidents and congresses have
in effect decided that the president only needs to enjoy the power to remove
hydra heads for cause, rather than at-will.
In sharp contrast to the broad operational freedom typically enjoyed by
the chief official in the single-headed department, like the treasury, each
member of a hydra-head commission is routinely subject to close
monitoring by each other member for possible misconduct, and any
commissioner who has concerns about a peer is well positioned to confirm
with other commissioners and to report these concerns immediately to the
president. As a result the president doesn't need to have the preemptory
power to remove at-will, nor to assure commission members due
subordination and energetic performance. Removability for cause,
supplemented by the additional horizontal monitoring provided by a multi-
member commission and structure, may well suffice if Congress and the
President prefer this alternative accountability structure and embed this
accountability structure into the department's enabling statute.
Now, at the end of my talk I'm going to come back and give you a few
more thoughts on independent agencies, so I'm going to come back to that
point in just a few minutes. But even if the decision of 1789 does not
require at-will removability of the hydra-headed department heads like the
Fed, the decision of 1789 does firmly establish that neither Congress as a
whole nor the Senate nor any subset of these bodies can properly participate
in any specific removal decision outside impeachment. Whatever removal
power exists, whether at-will or for cause, is ultimately executive power,
not legislative or senatorial power, and thus properly resides solely within
the executive branch. This much, at least, was settled for good in 1789,
even if other elements of the 1789 settlement may plausibly be read in
different ways. Thus, the opening executive power language of Article II
was not only clarified and qualified by the textual list of specified
presidential powers that appeared later in Article II, but was additionally
glossed, clarified, and qualified by the basic settlement achieved between
the first Congress and President Washington. And Madison predicted as
much; this is what he said to the first Congress: "The decision that is at this
time made will become the permanent exposition of the Constitution."7
Okay, I'm going to skip some other stuff because-and I do want to say
a little more about independent agencies and I very much want to get into a
conversation with you all. I have another section of this paper where I talk
about how in 1787 most people probably expected that the Senate would
7. James Madison, Speech in Congress on Presidential Removal Power (June 16, 1789).
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emerge as the president's sounding board, and that's not what happened, it
actually turns out to be a thing called the cabinet, and how did that emerge,
and I identify a few features. One thing that is very important to understand
that I emphasize is that cabinet officers answer to the President, not vice
versa. He can choose to consult them, but the buck stops with him. And one
very important idea of the Constitution is that there wasn't going to be just
a secret executive council that took votes and the president would say, look,
I wanted to do this, but I was overruled by my council, so that was
explicitly repudiated by the Constitution, the federalist papers explicitly
repudiate that model, and the opinions clause is in fact designed to ensure
that these individual department heads will answer to the president and
won't ever be able to formally-to outvote him in a secret vote, so-and to
the extent that the president actually ever consults the cabinet as a group,
it's in a little tension with the idea of the text which seems to suggest more
of a hub-and-spoke model where the president asks each officer, but doesn't
sort of consult them as a group, but I say, well, why does the group concept
emerge, and I identify about four reasons: One, because various issues
involve more than one department, you know, are you going to set up a
national bank, well, that involves a legal issue, it involves foreign affairs
like should aliens be able to be stockholders in this bank, so one reason is
that things spill over across the departments, the real world issues.
A second reason is that the Attorney General, by statute, actually
answered to each of the department heads and to the president and so
informally he kind of tied them all together and so it sort of made sense to
sort of confer with everyone because the AG is conferring with each
department head and the president.
A third reason is that Washington is a consultative sort. He had been
served well by councils of war in the revolutionary war experience, and so
he's often looking for advice. He'll make his own decision, but he's not
afraid to broadly consult. And there was, of course, English practice of
privy council, state practice of state executive councils and so the federal
constitution emerges with something that some resembles other things, but
with a very strong still unitary executive making his own decisions. And the
rawness of the cabinet, to some extent, occurs at the expense of the Senate.
People who are voting for the Constitution might well expect that the
Senate would emerge as the consultative body. Why doesn't that happen?
Here's why they might have expected it: Because in most of the states the
upper house-most of the colonies and then many of the states, the upper
house of the legislature doubles as an executive council and twice the
Constitution's text refers to the Senate using words "advice" and "consent,"
so you might have thought that that's what's going to emerge. It doesn't. So
why not? Upon reflection, there are some structural mismatches.
Washington actually at first tried to consult the Senate. I have a couple
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of quotes. Washington goes to the Senate to ask for their advice on
something and the senators are afraid to say yes too quickly. Here's what
one senator writes in his diary; you know, he's worried that if the Senate
says yes to the President too quickly, it's almost like a woman on a date or
something, just the way he writes it, her first date or something, you know,
should she kiss him on the first date. She says, we should have these
advices and consents ravished in a degree from us, you know. I saw no
chance for a fair investigation of subjects while the President of the United
States sat there to support his opinions and overall the timid and neutral part
of the Senate, so we're not going to, you know, say yes to him too quickly
on the first date because otherwise he won't respect us in the morning or
something.
Then Washington has to leave and as he leaves, you know, he actually
is very frustrated, he says, "this defeats every purpose of my coming here."
He sort of loses his temper momentarily, then he regains his composure
because Washington is the master of his emotions. He comes back the
next-a couple days later, sits through a very tedious Senate conversation,
they finally agree to what he wants to do, and as he walks out, here's
actually the third-hand account, one person hears him saying, "He would be
damned if he ever went there again," and basically he never goes there
again to get official advice and consent. But if that's the only reason that
they're afraid of Washington or something, there should have been
emerging sort of a practice of written consultation in advance back and
forth before the president does things that doesn't emerge.
Why not? Several things. Why does he basically start conferring with
the cabinet rather than the Senate. One, the Senate is too big to be really a
secret body. These earlier executive councils were composed of twelve
people, the Senate begins at twenty four, it ends at thirty two, it's going to
get much bigger. Two, [the Senate] can't keep a secret. Three, [the Senate]
is answerable to state legislatures and ultimately not to him, whereas
cabinet officers answer to him and if they leave-now, all of this is made
possible by the decision of 1789, you see, because if the Senate has to be
involved in every cabinet firing, well then the cabinet officers are going to
suck up to the Senate to some important extent and needs to stay in its good
graces. And by the way, the senators also want to leave town, they have to
go back home and tell the folks back home what they've done. The cabinet
is going to stay there and do their job; but if the decision of 1789 had been
decided differently, then the cabinet officers might be tempted to
accompany senators back home and to lobby state legislatures to stay in
their good graces.
So the decision of 1789 enables everyone to specialize appropriately;
the Senate can go back home every so often and explain what they're doing,
the Cabinet can stay in place and advise Washington year-round and keep
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an eye on him. Senatorially-approved people can keep an eye on the
President. The Senate can feel responsible in leaving town because they
know that someone's there watching the President in case there is
something mischievous going on, and at the end of the day the President
himself can be responsible for all executive conduct.
Let me finally just come back to independent agencies and in about ten
minutes tell you how I think about independent agencies, because I think
here is where I probably might disagree the most with some of the folks on
the panel. Because I reckon myself a unitary executive person, but we come
in many flavors and sizes. What are we talking about here, independent
agencies created over the last century, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Reserve
Board, and the Consumer Products Safety Commission.
In what sense are these agencies independent? You know, well, some
people say, oh, they're independent because they do a lot of functions, they
promulgate rules of conduct like the legislature, they enforce criminal
statutes like an executive branch, they sort of perform quasi adjudicatory
tasks of deciding things even between private parties like a court. That
alone doesn't make them independent, that's what executive power is, as I
said before. So this mixture of functions itself, it doesn't mean that they're
somehow not executive. They do not float freely between the Congress and
the President, nor is it the case that Congress can kind of put them
anywhere it wants on the continuum.
Here are the rules: First, they're appointed by the President, not by
Congress, not by any subpart of Congress, okay? Congress has tried in the
past to appoint these folks and the Supreme Court said, no, you can't do
that, that's, for example, the Buckley versus Valco case, so the rules of
appointment are very clear, these are appointed by presidents, not by
congresses.8 How are they removed, they're not removed by Congress as a
whole, they're not removed by the Senate, the Senate plays no role in their
removal, nor does Congress as a whole or any subpart committee, they're
removed unilaterally by the President and only the President. So they're
executive agencies, whatever power to remove them is executive power.
Now, it is true that they're not removable at-will, they're removable for
cause, and that's the key difference between them. Now, why is this
difference between the Fed and the Treasury again sort of possible? True,
we could read the Constitution. Essentially, we could read the vesting
clause to imply that all top executive officials must be removable at-will.
We could further read the Constitution to imply that whenever a statute
creates any executive branch discretion or decisional authority, the
President may always substitute his own personal discretion or decision for
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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that of any high-level executive official, even when the statute explicitly
vets the discretion or decisional authority in the official and not the
President, but this is hardly a required reading of the text, which after all
qualifies as initial branch of executive power to the President in a variety of
ways.
A later clause of Article II says the President, "Shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."9 The clause doesn't say that the President shall
personally execute all the laws, it says he shall oversee others and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed by others who may indeed be vested by
statute of certain discretion or decisional authority in domains where these
independent officials possess distinctive expertise or impartiality, or so the
Constitution can plausibly be read, and here's my key point, and so actual
practice has in fact operated for decades and perhaps centuries and this
reading enables the Constitution's text and actual practice to cohere.
Now, you can't remove them at-will, but what powers does he have
over these independent agencies? He can dismiss any independent, quote-
unquote, official who's not faithfully executing the law, anyone who's
corrupt or negligent or lawless, he can also dismiss them if they're
insubordinate to his proper rule as superintendent of the executive branch
and the wielder of a broad set of powers that the Constitution does vest in
him personally. For example, he personally has the pardon power, and so if
some independent prosecutor wants to go after someone and he tells the
independent prosecutor, no, I don't want you to go after this person, I
would think that the independent prosecutor would have to listen to him
because he has the greater power of pardon and, therefore, the lesser power
of non-prosecution. If the so-called, quote-unquote, independent prosecutor
doesn't listen to him, he's being insubordinate and that's grounds for
removal because the Constitution itself gives the President and the
President alone power to pardon and not prosecute. So this casual label of
independent agency shouldn't blind us to the key point that these officials,
quote-unquote, independent, falls wholly within the executive branch, albeit
with varied rules of composition authority and removal.
Here's my key way of cabining this, and I close in one minute, the
history of practice, viewed through the prism of constitutional text and
structure suggests that in three particular contexts the independent agency
model may have special appeal. First, when an executive department is
vested up by a committee rather than a single officer. Second, when there
exists a strong need to create a fixed tenure office embodying technical
expertise or nonpartisanship. And third, when an executive department-all
three of these typically need to be in place, when an executive department
operates in the manner that does not tightly intertwine with specific grants
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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of personal presidential authority, such as the power to pardon criminals, to
pardon the foreign leaders, to supervise cabinet officers and so on.
While the powers vested in independent agencies and limited
removability of these agency officials do constrain presidents, here's my
final point, virtually all modem presidents have accepted these constraints,
in sharp contrast to many presidents who have loudly objected to
improvisations, such as the legislative veto or the statutory independent
council under the so-called Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
Those improvisations, independent councils under the 1978 act and the
legislative vetoes weakened presidents vis-d-vis Congress and courts. By
contrast, limitations on the removal of independent agency officials have
merely reshuffled power among presidents; also a president may not
remove at-will all the officials he inherits on his first day in office, neither
may his successor remove at-will all the officials he manages to appoint
between his first and last day on the job. Each president gets a fair share of
presidential power, albeit with a time lag. Put differently, independent
agencies do not involve any legislative vetoes in removals, they don't give
judges nonjudicial power to appoint executive officials.
Unlike legislative vetoes for the independent council statute that's now
lapsed, laws establishing independent agencies do not vest members of
other departments with any executive power whatsoever; rather these laws
merely allocate authority within the executive branch between the president
and his subordinates. Many presidents over the years may not have even
wanted truly plenary power to remove and/or countermand all executive
officials. The responsibility to review on a clean slate every policy decision
made by every underling might well have weakened modem presidents by
overloading them, making it harder for them to concentrate on the issues
that matter most, especially in areas where the Constitution or statute vested
them with personal decisional authority.
In this respect, modem presidents confront a qualitatively different
problem of supervision than the challenge faced by George Washington,
who stood atop a federal bureaucracy of infinitesimal size by modem
standards. In the end the simple fact that modem presidents themselves
have embraced independent agencies furnishes a strong reason for the rest
of us, likewise, to make room for these agencies as we ponder the terse text
of Article II.
MR. TONY NAGORSKI: Well, thank you, Professor Amar, for your
comments, and I'd like to open it up now to our panelists and audience
members for any questions that they may have. Panel members? Go ahead.
PROFESSOR JOHN YOO: The question I have about Washington is I
don't disagree with your point of view on the things he did, but the question
I have is, why did they last? So like Washington at the beginning of the
Constitution is the father of the country and the general who won the
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revolution. By the time he leaves office he's a very conservative partisan
figure. You have a political party founded by Jefferson that arises to oppose
his policies, so why isn't it the case that by the time-when Jefferson takes
office in 1800 they just don't, you know, wipe away all of these
Washington precedents and instead, as you point out, the law of
Washington did survive until today, but it's not-you know, it's not
obvious that they should have and why didn't normal politics put into
practice something else or why do we have a tradition now where each
political party, when they take office and they control the presidency, gets
to put in its own set of different rules and understandings of the
Constitution?
PROFESSOR AMAR: It's a great point that-a question that ramifies
in many directions. So one interesting difference between the judiciary and
the presidency is the judiciary doesn't turn over all at once and I think-
what the presidency does and I think over the long run that has actually
often helped the judiciary because new people come on one at a time and
they become very much assimilated to expanding judicial power and they
don't just automatically or even if they wanted to they aren't able to undo
everything immediately. And some presidents may be tempted to try to
undo everything that their predecessor did because they come to power on a
Steven [inaudible]-like creative destruction wave and that might, in some
ways, long-term weaken the presidency as each president is tempted maybe
to tear down what his predecessor did, the guy that he in effect beat, either
by running against an incumbent and beating him or by running in effect
against the incumbent's record.
Barack Obama basically bested George W. Bush and not merely John
McCain, he ran in effect against the incumbent's record. So it's a deep point
that there might be a temptation on the part of some presidents just to tear
down what their predecessors have done. That's less true for the judges
because they change more glacially; more like the Senate, for example, with
its staggered election system.
My own story about why some things have stuck and others haven't is
actually surprisingly naive, when my claim is that certain things that really
don't fit the text don't last. Legislative vetoes really are whoppingly
unconstitutional and eventually, you know, they have a run but they get
struck down. The independent council statute in the end doesn't last
precisely because it really doesn't fit the Constitution to have judges
appointing prosecutors; in what sense can you be inferior and independent.
One thought is over the long run precisely because there is enough-
there are enough people out there in the citizenry and in the different
branches who are constitutional textualists, who do sort of have a certain
maybe even naive respect for worship of the text, practices that really are
very much contrary to the clear meaning of the text have a tougher time of
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it, they get re-agitated again and again. Or put differently, you know, a
clause can sleep for a long time, but if it's in the Constitution it can
plausibly re-awaken, whether it's the Tenth Amendment or the Ninth
Amendment or the Second Amendment, for that matter, or even, you know,
the privileges or immunities clause I'm still hoping, John [Yoo], that our
friend Justice Thomas, you know, keeps pushing that clause, you know, and
he has a ground to stand on because that clause really is in the text, you
know, in a way that the words substantive due process aren't quite in the
text.
So one thing the Washington precedents that survive, many of them
survive because they are plausible glosses on the text, so that's one point.
And the one that really doesn't, the idea that a president, merely by decree,
can create a federal law really is, in my view, very strongly inconsistent
with deep structural and textual principles, and that's the one where the
Jeffersonians on the court pushed back with Hudson and Goodwin' ° and
that's basically the Jeffersonians on the court saying, this violates our
understanding of federal power, and that's partly because they thought that
a federal common law of crimes was an outrage when federalists had
floated the idea in support of the Federal Sedition Law of 1978, the
federalists said, listen, there's a Federal Sedition Law of common law, this
statute that we're passing actually softens it, so this is a reform measure.
That whole federalist argument, which the Republicans didn't buy,
pivoted on the permissibility of a Federal Sedition Law that was a matter of
federal common law. The Republicans didn't buy any of that so Hudson
and Goodwin" is connected to anti-federalist Jeffersonian ideology, but it
taps in, in my view, to a deep understanding of Constitutional structure.
So one point is, Washington's practices survive best because most of
them really were plausible interpretations of the Constitution when there
was indeterminacy. Second reason they survive is the need for settlement.
Sometimes we just need rules, you know, whether we drive on the right side
or the left side of the street, we've got to figure it out and it matters more
that there be a rule than that it be some perfect rule.
The Constitution, precisely because Article II is so indeterminate on a
bunch of things and we need rules on what formally, makes a treaty a treaty,
how can negotiations in treaties be conducted, who gets to recognize,
indeed recognize. We at least give us a default principle, and so we need
some settlement of this; the text doesn't and this glosses the text. Third,
these settlements tend to involve inter-branch truces. My point about
independent agencies, for example, is presidents have signed off on them.
My point about the decision of 1789 is, Congress signed off on the fact that
10. Hudson, II U.S. 32 (1812).
11. Id.
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there be unilateral presidential power to dismiss.
So when even the branch that's disadvantaged and sort of agreeing to
the thing, this is a kind of acromin-like point about when the three branches
might agree. I don't think it's maybe true of all constitutional law, but when
the constitutional law is the law of the three branches and when all three
branches really do agree on a point, I think it's more likely to say that that's
been settled. Presidents never agreed to legislative vetoes, as Steve
Calabrese and others have pointed out, and they never really-I mean, lots
of presidents have objected to the independent council statute, to 1978
statute, so those things, haven't stuck partly because they're constitutionally
preposterous and partly because actually there hasn't been a solid three-
branch agreement.
And then finally, as you know, John [Yoo], Thomas Jefferson is against
all sorts of executive power until he becomes executive and then he begins
to understand, that maybe there's actually a reason why executive power
needs to be exercised in all. So he does all sorts of things as president that
violate his own earlier constitutional understandings, whether that's
acquiring Louisiana or having a sweeping embargo policy, and so, it's
actually useful so that basically presence of both parties early on begin to
understand the need for executive power. So he talks one game when he's
out of power, but he does a different thing when he's president, and once
we have the combination-so I think you're right, John [Yoo], also that to
the extent I just emphasized Washington and the fact that everyone's
agreeing to it at the time, I'm missing one other thing that's an important
part of the story, which is Jefferson blesses all of this, and once you have
the combination of Washington doing it and Jefferson doing it again, like
with the Louisiana Purchase, following the script for the negotiation of the
Jay Treaty, then it becomes really settled in a very deep way when
presidents of both parties have done it.
MR. NAGORSKI: This question is from the audience, Professor Amar:
Should presidential powers increase to accommodate an ever-more-
complex world and do modem interpretations of presidential powers take
into account the U.S.'s increased size and prosperity, since the original
enactment of the Constitution?
PROFESSOR AMAR: That's a great question. Some provisions of the
Constitution are pegged to facts about the world in accordion-like fashion.
Before I talk about the president, let me just give you an example of the
economy. The Interstate Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to
regulate certain kinds of transactions that are genuinely interstate and
international. I myself think the key test is really, are they interstate and
international, rather than, are they narrowly economic, but for present
purposes it doesn't really matter whether you agree with me on that or not.
One key trigger, I would say it is the key trigger, but someone else
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would say there's also an economic component, but one key trigger is, is
something really interstate in nature; if it really is, not in a winking way, but
in a real way, Congress has power to regulate it, if it really is interstate or
international. And then we have to figure out how strict we're going to be
about applying that test.
Now, here's a fact: In 1787 most of the world is not really interstate.
Most Americans live and die within a fifty-mile radius, they don't cross
state lines, neither do most goods and services that they're producing and
consuming. My children believe that they get milk from cartons; you know,
200 years ago people understood that milk came from cows, there was a
cow in every neighborhood because there wasn't refrigeration technology.
Today there are cows in three states: Wisconsin, Vermont and California
and the rest of us get all our milk from those three states.
One silly mistake in one place in Iowa compromises the entire food
chain across America when they're contaminated eggs; and eggs, of course,
are part of all sorts of foods, so that our world-I'm not just making it up
because I believe in Leviathan, it's just the case that today, because of
improvements or changes in communications technology and transportation
technology and refrigeration technology, a lot more of our world really is
interstate and international in a way that it wasn't before. Ninety-five
percent of the GDP really is three degrees of Kevin Bacon, you know, it's
connected in a way that wasn't at the founding, so I think Congress has
more power today on the ground in fact than at the founding for three
reasons: One I just gave you, because as a matter of fact there's more
interstate stuff and Congress's power-if the facts accordion out, there
really is more interesting commerce and Congress's powers peg to that,
Congress's power accordions out; have there been factual changes. A
second reason we have more federal powers, we have a whole series of
constitutional amendments that explicitly give Congress more power. The
Bill of Rights begins with the words "Congress shall make no law" and
ends with the Tenth Amendment that's about states' rights. The Thirteenth
Amendment ends with the words "Congress shall have power." The
Fourteenth Amendment ends with the words "Congress shall have power."
The Fifteenth Amendment ends with the words "Congress shall have
power."
After the Civil War, there was power given to the federal government.
The Sixteenth Amendment is a huge grant of federal power. The
Seventeenth Amendment doesn't formally expand federal power, but it
makes senators a lot more willing to impose mandates on states and do
other things because they don't have to answer to state legislatures. So the
second reason we have a lot more federal power today is that we've had,
sort of the second and third reasons, a series of amendments that have
expanded federal power and that have made the federal government more
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willing to use that power because it's structured differently. So those are
three reasons why we really do have legitimately a more powerful federal
government today because we have bigger fat, more interstate and
international stuff, constitutional amendments and a different structure.
Now let's take all that and apply it to the presidency.
When you have wars, you will have more power in the federal
government in general and within the federal government more power in
the executive, and when America-when you have a closer connection to
the rest of the world you will have more power in the federal government
because it's tasked with foreign affairs, and within the federal government
lots of power, maybe more power than the president because he's the sole
organ of communication, he's the one negotiating these treaties, he's the
one recognizing and de-recognizing. So in the founder's world when we
were separated by vast oceanic moats from the rest of the world, the federal
government played less of a role and the president was less powerful and
significant.
Today we live in a very small world and a world of permanent war. I
have known in my lifetime nothing but war. The wars have been cold and
hot, but for the entirety of my life I lived under the cold war and which
flared up in all sorts of hot ways in Vietnam and elsewhere. The war on
terror so-called will be endless. Before 9/11 the last time foreigners drew
blood on American soil in the heartland was the war of 1812, okay, but
today we live in a world where that threat is on the president and that, yes,
is going to make the federal government stronger in general, and within the
federal government the president stronger, so that's just the accordion fact
of our world.
Now we've had a series of constitutional amendments that have
empowered the federal government more and the president's part of the
federal government and the series of constitutional amendments that have
strengthened the personal connection between the president and the
citizens; an amendment, for example, talking about primary elections, you
know, there were no primary elections before 1960. LBJ thinks he can be
elected president without entering a single primary, John Kennedy only
enters seven primaries in 1960 because those are the only primaries; but
today there's a more direct connection between voters and the president
than sort of ever before, enabling presidents more than ever before to claim
mandates; they sit atop, as I said, a much vaster federal bureaucracy.
So, yes, facts of the world have changed, the constitution's law of
federal power has changed and the constitution's structure has changed,
making presidents more willing to use power.
MR. NAGORSKI: Thank you, Professor Amar. Another question from
the audience: Given the proximity of the ratification of the Constitution to
the Revolutionary War, do you think an intent argument could be made that
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the founders accounted for extra legal measures afforded to the President?
PROFESSOR AMAR: Extra legal measure-could you read that one
again. I thought it was going in a different direction, but maybe I
misunderstood.
MR. NAGORSKI: Do you think an intent argument could be made that
the founders accounted for extra legal measures afforded to the President?
PROFESSOR AMAR: Extra legal measures, that begins to make me a
little nervous, extra legal measures. I'm nervous both by extra legal
measures of presidents asserting all sorts of extra legal powers. I'm also
made a little nervous by what Sharron Angle calls Second Amendment
remedies. If by that she means taking up arms against a duly elected
government, I would say, been there, done that, it's called the Civil War.
Let's not do that again. I'm with Mr. Lincoln on that.
So those make me-that talk makes me-the Second Amendment does
come out of the American Revolution, and in the American Revolution the
heroes are militias and George Washington, okay? But you have to
remember that those militias are rebelling against governments that no one
voted for in America; no one voted for Parliament, no one voted for the
king, and it's a very different thing to have extra legal remedies against a
duly elected government and that makes me very, very nervous, that idea.
So when appealing to 1776, these militias in 1861 take up arms against
Lincoln, I think that's totally different because he was duly elected and
they've completely misunderstood the proper meaning of the Second
Amendment.
And after the Civil War, you see, the Constitution is amended in a way
that cuts back on some of these militia ideas and even local jury ideas,
creating a much more powerful central government. Who actually
supervises the actual ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment; it's the
federal army, not local militias.
So if by "extra legal" we mean extra legal resort against the president
because you voted against him, that makes me nervous. If "extra legal"
means that he can do all sorts of things to save the country, that makes me
nervous. Lincoln didn't quite claim that, by the way. I think what Lincoln
did was completely legal in almost every respect. Lincoln did say, look, I'm
the only officer who's in power 24/7, 365, stuff happens, it often happens
when Congress isn't in session, and in order to preserve the ability of
Congress even to meet, it may very well be necessary that I unilaterally
have to take certain actions precisely to preserve the status quo, to create the
conditions under which Congress actually can meet, and once they do meet,
so I've taken all sorts of unilateral action, Lincoln says, because I was the
only one in town; if I didn't do these things, the capitol would have fallen. I
did all these things, I immediately called Congress into special session, at
that special session I immediately told them everything that I had done, I
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told them further they have to pass laws authorizing nunc pro tunc,
retroactively blessing what I've done, and if they think I've done anything
wrong they should impeach me, and if I hadn't done these things, the
Constitution itself might have failed.
We could lose various wars and still be America. Not all wars are
existential wars, there are only four wars that I think America has to win: It
has to win the Revolutionary War, otherwise there's no Constitution. It has
to win the War of 1812, otherwise, again, we're just all under the King
again, that's just the Revolutionary War, part two. It has to win the Civil
War, because otherwise government of, by, and for the people cannot-it
will perish from the earth if people who lost an election fair and square are
able to overturn its result by force of arms. I think as a practical matter
World War II has to be won, otherwise in the long run America loses if
Mussolini and Tojo and Hirohito and Hitler all ally, possibly even with
Stalin.
The War on Terror is a little different, they could kill millions of
people, these terrorists, but they actually couldn't destroy our own
constitutional system. We could tear it down, we could destroy it, if we sort
of start to do too many extra legal things in the name of preserving our
system. So extra legal makes me nervous.
MR. NAGORSKI: Are there any other questions from the panel at this
time? Otherwise I can ask another audience question here. As a lay person,
isn't the real issue how these theories of executive power, how they'll result
in minimizing illegal and immoral conduct?
PROFESSOR AMAR: Yes, excellent, yes, that's-the system is
designed ultimately to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity. And in my view, the federal government is very much a national
security system.
Why, after an American revolution that was fought by localists against
an imperial center would you ever create such a strong new federal
government and a strong new executive, and the answer is ultimately
because, as dangerous as that is, King George III, is more dangerous and
you need someone to protect you against King George III, and thank God
we actually have someone whom we can trust to do that, to protect us
against George III, who won't become himself a George III, his name is
George Washington, the system is really designed for him, it's a national
security office and a national security-ultimately it's not about the
economy, the way Charles Beard said it was, "it" being the Constitution.
I think it's ultimately about national security. And so our threats to
liberty can come from threats abroad that would conquer America from
without, but our threats to liberty can also come from an overly powerful
government that does things that it's not supposed to do. And that overly
powerful government is, you know, this is just from civics, the idea is to
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keep it in check through regular elections and through separation of powers
and checks and balances and judicial review and federalism.
So here's one really important check, we have elections every two
years, come hell or high water. Britain didn't do that, they didn't have an
election at all in Britain between 1935 and 1945, they just canceled all the
elections. The incumbents formed a coalition of national unity and just
preserved themselves in power. We don't do that, we held an election fair
and square, even in the middle-twice in the middle of a great civil war,
and the second time-and Lincoln lost badly the first time around and the
second time around he thought he was going to lose badly; he ended up not.
But that's an important check, so, I don't care how you vote, but I do want
all of you to vote. That's one of the biggest checks you have, whether you
like what your government has been doing or you don't like what your
government has been doing. And two years is a pretty-it just works like
clockwork, it's pretty amazing, and in fact every two years the Army gets
defunded, under the Constitution every two years there has to be a new bill
authorizing funding of the military, that constitutionally lapses, sunsets,
which connects to some conversations that you may be having about
Congress's power of the purse and foreign affairs more generally. That two
years is connected to the two-year electoral cycle, that's basically about-if
at any point you guys don't want a war, just say no.
MR. NAGORSKI: Thank you, Professor Amar. I think we have time
for one more question. Would one of the panelists like to ask a question to
end it?
PROFESSOR ROBERT DELAHUNTY: Let me just ask a question
about independent agencies, if I may. The Federal Reserve Board, which
you mentioned, Professor Amar, is certainly well-entrenched, but it also, as
we know, plays a very powerful policy role. Some people who believe in
the unconstitutionality of independent agencies, including that one, would
argue that-
PROFESSOR AMAR: Which one?
PROFESSOR DELAHUNTY: The Federal Reserve Board. Yes. Would
argue that its power is so extensive that it could really thwart the president
in a material way from carrying out the policies that he's announced to the
nation and was elected to execute. I mean, if we have a president who wants
a stimulus plan, but a Federal Reserve Board that is intent on controlling
inflation and keeping interest rates high, it frustrates the executive will and
probably also the legislative will. Is that an obstacle to the constitutionality
of an independent agency like the Federal Reserve Board or not, do you
think?
PROFESSOR AMAR: I think that's an outstanding question and so if I
were just looking at the text and structure in a vacuum, that might have
been my inclination. Now, here's in the end why that's not what I said:
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Because it's not our practice and it hasn't been our practice for at least
seventy-five years, as to the fed itself, because I know of no president,
Republican or Democrat, liberal or conservative, who's made the argument
that you just made in opposition to the Fed and so it does move me, but
many academics have, and I'm not unsympathetic to the theoretical
argument, but no president-and if I'm wrong on that fact, then I would
need to rethink my theory-
PROFESSOR DELAHUNTY: We thought about it in Bush I, but it
came to nothing.
PROFESSOR AMAR: So third, because one could argue that
precursors of this exist as early as the first bank and so it's not just even the
last years, depending on how much you buy Professor Mashaw's idea,
either the first patent office was an independent agency or these early
commissions to oversee the Mint, that was an independent agency, or the
Bank of the United States or something, so arguably it goes back even
further and definitely attorneys general, as early as William Wirt, are
backing away from the strongest aversion of the unitary executive theory.
Even Roger Taney won't fully back Andy Jackson on the most robust
vision of the theory. I did sneak in yet an additional new argument, because
I am actually worried about this, you know, because truthfully, functionally
I'm not completely clear on why the treasury is so different from the Fed
when I look at what they actually do, and so I fell back on this sort of form
list, well, a single-headed agency versus a hydra-head, but when I actually
look at what they do, they have all sorts of committees together so we-you
make a very good point. I hear you.
One other thing that I did try to slip in is, there is one part of the
Constitution recently that can be understood to bless the constitutionality of
independent agencies. So even if the-it's a bad idea, if it's in the
Constitution, well, it's in the Constitution, and believe it or not, it's in the
2 5 th Amendment, and the 25 th Amendment, actually, sharply distinguishes
between cabinet officers and sort of other offices.
Let me see if I can find that little 2 5th Amendment discussion here,
because arguably the 2 5th Amendment provides modern blessing,
reinforcement of the idea of independent agencies. Let me see if I can find
it, and if not, I'll just have to actually read from the text of the Constitution
itself, God forbid. Yes, so let me just read it for what it's worth. One
additional element of coherence and reinforcement may be found in Section
IV of the 2 5th Amendment, which was ratified in 1967, well after the high-
profile emergence of independent agencies. Section IV singles out, "the
principal officers of the executive departments," for special responsibilities.
Unless statutes specify otherwise, these officers and only these officers
decide in the first instance whether a president is so disabled as to warrant
his displacement by a vice president.
The President, the Cabinet, and Independent Agencies
True, Section IV does not speak directly to the issue of whether a
president may unilaterally oust all high-level executive branch officials, but
it does address a similar, indeed a symmetric question, whether high-level
executive branch officials may ever oust the president, and the officials who
are specified by Section IV to make this ouster decision are "principals,
officers of the executive departments," cabinet heads in evident
contradistinction to the board members or commissioners of independent
agencies. According to the relevant congressional report "only officials of
cabinet rank should participate in the decision as to whether a presidential
inability exists. The intent is that the presidential appointees who direct the
ten executive departments named in 5 U.S.C. Section I, or any executive
department established in the future generally considered to comprise the
president's cabinet would participate to determine inability. 12
Because presidents are responsible for monitoring cabinet officers,
monitoring that includes the power of at-will removal, these cabinet officers
are symmetrically best positioned to monitor the president for signs of
disability. Independent agency officials are not in the same position to
personally and closely monitor the president, precisely because they are not
as a rule personally and closely monitored by the president himself or
removable at-will by the president, for that matter. In large part, the
commissioners of independent agencies monitor and are monitored by each
other, rather than monitoring and being monitored by the president in
cabinet-style fashion. Thus, even if the basic distinction between cabinet
department and independent agencies was not clearly established in the
constitutional text prior to 1967, the 2 5th Amendment can be read as a
constitutional codification of this basic distinction and an implicit
enforcement of the constitutionality of independent agencies. Now, ladies
and gentlemen, you know, you can buy that one if not, but that's actually a
genuinely new idea, that's a new contribution to the literature. It's sort of in
my trademark a clever little textual point that everyone else has overlooked,
but I'm doing that cleverness ultimately honestly in the service of not
having to declare a vast amount of modern practice unconstitutional,
because I do find that kind of destabilizing.
12. H.R.Rep. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965).
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